Minister Budaj bojuje proti zatajovaniu informácií v jadrovej energetike
Bericht von Patricia Lorenz :
In seiner Pressekonferenz machte der Umweltminister der Slowakei, Ján Budaj, darauf aufmerksam, dass die vorige Regierung ungern informierte. Die größte Endbericht Slowakei Geheimhaltung herrschte in einem Bereich, dessen schwerwiegende Folgen bekannt sind – nämlich in der Atomenergienutzung. Er sagte:
„Auch die Öffentlichkeit braucht höchste Informiertheit, doch bei der vorigen Regierung war das Gegenteil der Fall. Die Novellierung des Atomgesetzes ging genau in die andere Richtung, es erhöhte sich das Ausmaß der klassifizierbaren Informationen. Es gibt Informationen, die nicht einmal dem Umweltministerium bzw. anderen staatlichen Institutionen zugänglich sind. Daher habe ich mich im Juni an UJD gewendet, dass dies zu ändern ist. Wenn UJD nicht handelt, wird das Umweltministerium eine Gesetzesnovelle vorlegen. Die Bürger wählten 2020 eine offene Regierung und wir werden alles dafür tun, dass Umweltinformation nicht geheimgehalten wird.
In Europa hat man gesehen, dass es in der SR in die andere Richtung ging und machte uns aufmerksam, dass wir Aarhus verletzen. Diese Konvention ist EU-Primärrecht, das kann man nicht einfach verletzen, denn es steht über der nationalen Legislative, es geht um Information.
Das Umweltministerium hat auch am 5. September 2020 im Ministerrat bei der Präsentation des Sicherheitsberichts zu Atommüll verlangt, die Informiertheit für Medien und Bürger wieder zu erhöhen. Dieser Nationale Bericht wurde, weil wir die Aarhus-Konventionen verletzen, mit einer Anmerkung des Umweltministeriums angenommen. Notwendig ist, mit den Bürgern einen offenen Dialog im Atombereich zu führen.“
Das Umweltministerium hat auch den Direktor von JAVYS (Dekommissionierung und Lagerung von Atommüll) zu einem Gespräch gebeten. Der Verbrennung von Atommüll wird nachgegangen und Informationen dazu werden veröffentlicht werden. Mehr Info als bisher ist nötig, vor allem die Gemeinden sollen wissen, was Atomenergie und atomarer Abfall verursachen können.
Diese Regierung wird auch im Atombereich offen und transparent sein.
https://www.facebook.com/minzp.sk/videos/365027648009719
https://www.minzp.sk/spravy/minister-budaj-bojuje-proti-zatajovaniu-informacii-jadrovej-energetike.html
Kernkraftwerk Mochovce Blöcke 3 und 4 – Fakten und Ausblick 17.1.2020
Die Informationen und Gegeninformationen halten an und sorgen z.T. nicht ganz unbeabsichtigt für Verwirrung. Deshalb ein aktueller Überblick über die Eckpunkte zu Mochovce 34, dem ersten AKW in der EU, welches seit der Inbetriebnahme von Mochovce 1&2 (1998), Temelin1&2 (2002) und Cernavoda II in Rumänien (2007) in Betrieb gehen soll. Es ist vor allem GLOBAL 2000, die Umweltorganisation, die regelmäßig informiert und regelmäßig von Whistleblowern informiert wird. Derer sind es fünf, die sich auf verschiedene technische Gebiete bzw. Anlagen, vor allem in Block 3, fokussieren. In Summe wird der Verdacht bestärkt, der seit Jahren auch bereits von WANO (Vereinigung der AKW-Betreiber!!) 2017 geäußert wurde: Das Missmanagement bei der Errichtung ist so gravierend, dass praktisch ununterbrochen neue Mängel auftauchen, und selbst bei deren Behebung wieder weitere entstehen: Viele Schäden sind auch nicht mehr behebbar, weil der Schmutz die Anlagen – vor allem im Bereich Elektro – unwiderbringlich schädigt. Daher wird nicht nur von der Aufsichtsbehörde der Slowakei (UJD) selbst geprüft, sondern das „Radl“ der mehr oder weniger strikten Missionen diverser Institutionen hat sich zu drehen begonnen. Hier ein kurzer Überblick über Mission und die dazugehörigen Berichte: Abschluss der UVP zu Mochovce 34: Da viele Themen (insbes. Erdbebensicherheit/Seismik ) nicht abgeschlossen wurden, fanden sie in bilateralen (vertraulichen!) Workshops unter Experten weitere Behandlung. Ein dazu verfasster und auch von der Atomaufsichtsbehörde UJD SR freigegebener Bericht ist bis heute nicht erstellt worden. Mission österreichischer Experten im Herbst 2019 auf Wunsch der Bundesregierung mit Begehung in Reaktion auf die schweren Mängel, die von GLOBAL 2000 im Herbst aufgedeckt wurden. Bisher kein offizieller Bericht verfügbar. OSART-Mission der IAEA Ende 2019: Mission abgeschlossen, Bericht der Experten muss von der slowakischen Regierung abgenommen werden, kann bis zu 6 Monaten dauern. WANO Jahreswende 2019/2020: Bericht wird nicht veröffentlicht. Nicht nur aus Gründen der Sicherheit von ganz Europa, sondern um auch die Realität des Reaktorbaus im Jahr 2020 aufzuzeigen, ist es notwendig, genau zu beobachten und zu berichten. Während die Nuklear-Lobby auf allen Foren behauptet, mit AKW ihren Beitrag zur CO2-freien oder zumindest CO2-armen Versorgung zu bieten – wenn man sie doch bloß ließe – ist dies einfach nicht wahr. Denn die Probleme in Mochovce sind nicht nur bei dem seit 30 Jahren in Bau befindlichen AKW die Regel. Die mangelnde Kompetenz, das Fehlen von Fachkräften und die langwierige Lieferkette bei Komponenten für AKW, betrifft z.B. auch den Neubau Flamanville (EPR) in Frankreich. Gerade die Reparatur bei fehlerhaften Montagen und Lieferungen (Reaktordeckel und Schweißnähte! beim EPR) betreffen mittlerweile alle. In Wirklichkeit ist die Industrie nicht im Zusammenbruch, sondern bereits zusammengebrochen. Bei der jährlichen ENSREG-Konferenz (Vereinigung der Europäischen Nuklearaufsichtsbehörden) wurden bereits Pläne gewälzt, wie dem abgeholfen werden sollte. Eine völlig irrige Idee, öffentlich eine zusammengebrochene Industrie zu retten. Was ist zu erwarten? – Zeitplan Mochovce 34: Aktuell wird die Inbetriebnahme von Block 3 nicht vor dem 3. Quartal 2020 erwartet, eine Wiederholung des HotHydroTests ist notwendig, 54km an Kabeln sind auszutauschen und tausende weitere Mängel sind noch vorhanden. Der jüngste von einem offensichtlich auf der Baustelle von Mochovce 3 beschäftigten Whistleblower übermittelte Bericht ist alarmierend. Besonders bedenklich sind die fehlerhaften Signale, die von Kabeln ausgehen, die falsch verlegt bzw. aus mangelhaftem Material sind. Durch diese kann es im Volllastbetrieb dazu kommen, dass die Notkühlpumpen nicht gestartet werden können und der Reaktor im Notfall nicht gekühlt werden kann und das bedeutet einen Nuklearunfall im freien Fall. Zusammengefasst lässt sich sagen: Die Fehler werden vertuscht, auch intern gibt es das Bemühen des Managements, die Anzeige von Fehlern zu unterdrücken, um Zeit und Geld für deren Behebung zu sparen. Mittlerweile scheinen wieder einige Firmen die Baustelle verlassen zu haben. Das Budget wird erhöht werden müssen – woher ist unklar und am 29. Februar wird in der Slowakei das Parlament gewählt. Der Zustand des Blocks 4 scheint stark hinter dem von Block 3 hinterherzuhinken, d.h. es wird dann wohl noch ein Jahr dauern bis er auch nur theoretisch in Betrieb gehen könnte. Zusammengestellt von Patricia Lorenz für die website www.KERNfragen.at
Čaputová vrátila atómový zákon, má byť
rozpore s medzin.rodným dohovorom
Prezidentka podpísala novelu zákona o prokuratúre.
19. júl 2019 o 16:24 TASR Prezidentka Zuzana Čaputová.(Zdroj: TASR)
Písmo:A–|A+022
BRATISLAVA. Prezidentka SR Zuzana Čaputová vrátila do parlamentu na opätovné
prerokovanie novelu atómového zákona s pripomienkami.
Tvrdí, ţe by viedla k rozporu s medzinárodným dohovorom.
Hlavným cieľom návrhu zákona, ktorý schválila Národná rada (NR) SR na júnovej schôdzi, by malo byť podľa predkladateľov zlepšenie hospodárnosti a zefektívnenie vedených správnych konaní.
„Aplikácia novely by viedla k rozporu s medzin.rodným dohovorom, a teda by bezdôvodne obmedzovala práva verejnosti v prístupe k informáciám, účasti verejnosti na rozhodovacom procese a prístupe k spravodlivosti v záleţitostiach ţivotného prostredia, v tomto prípade v takej citlivej oblasti, akou je spustenie a prevádzka jadrových zariadení. Pripomienky smerujú k odstráneniu tohto rozporu,“ priblíţila slovenská hlava štátu. Správne konania týkaj.ce sa jadrových zariadení, ktoré sú na Úrade jadrového dozoru (ÚJD) SR vedené, majú byť podľa novely zákona efektívnejšie.
Podľa návrhu by sa mal upraviť aj spôsob komunikácie úradu voči tzv. dotknutej verejnosti. Ako poukazujú poslanci, atómový zákon uţ v súčasnosti upravuje doručovanie rozhodnutí dotknutej verejnosti prostredníctvom verejnej vyhlášky.
„S cieľom zabezpečiť efektívne informovanie dotknutej verejnosti sa navrhuje, aby sa v týchto prípadoch doručovali v priebehu konania prostredníctvom verejnej vyhlášky aj výzvy, upovedomenia, predvolania alebo iné písomnosti,“ uvádza sa v dôvodovej správe.
Proces nakladania ÚJD s informáciami, ktoré majú zákonom priznanú osobitnú ochranu, by sa mal tieţ zmeniť.
Zahŕňa to citlivé informácie, utajované skutočnosti, bankové tajomstvo, daňové tajomstvo, obchodné tajomstvo, telekomunikačné tajomstvo, poštové tajomstvo, zákonom uloţenú alebo uznanú povinnosť mlčanlivosti.
Poslanci zároveň navrhujú precizovať úpravu konaní vedených podľa atómového zákona a stavebného zákona, pričom sa má brať do úvahy ich vzájomný vzťah. Navrhovaným znením dôjde k explicitnému vyjadreniu, ţe atómový zákon je vo vzťahu ku konaniam o vydanie povolenia na predčasné uţívanie stavby, súhlasu na dočasné uţívanie stavby na skúšobnú prevádzku, kolaudačného rozhodnutia a ich zmien lex specialis voči stavebnému zákonu,“ priblíţili.
Quelle: https://domov.sme.sk/c/22171666/caputova-vratila-atomovy-zakon-ma-byt-rozpore-smedzinarodnym-
dohovorom.html#ixzz5uO82UwR1
ANTIATOM-PROJEKT SLOWAKEI 2019
Report January 2019 (Dana Mareková)
The Slovak nuclear sector is still struggling with its communist heritage. Dangerous nuclear decisions are made behind the closed doors. The nuclear regulator, UJD, has too much power and too little control. It´s decisions are not “double-checked” by a relatively weak (in this area) Ministry of Environment or civil society – as there is no anti-nuclear campaign.
There is however a certain chance to prevent the most dangerous moves by increasing scrutiny. UJD and MoE must feel pressure and there are three kinds of pressure, which seem to be feasible: legal, communication and diplomatic.
- Legal – from well targeted and strategic legal actions.
- Communication – via media.
- And diplomatic – from international community, lead by Austria using UN Conventions.
Slovak nuclear decision-making must not be done behind the closed doors any longer.
Ms Mareková sees a chance to initiate a public-service environmental impact assessment for „old projects“ – including access to information. For both V2 and Mochovce 1-4, certain decisions have been made without a valid EIA and without public participation. Court and Aarhus decisions can be used to challenge this.
Bohunice and Mochovce both have the problem expressed in the ACCC (Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee): The Slovak law does not provide for an adequate (note there was some EIA legislation, but not fully acc to international standards) EIA for buildings that were started before 2006, the date of the adoption of the valid Slovak EIA law. In this respect, some of these old projects did not have a sufficient public participation process , even if it concerns such large projects as Bohunice and Mochovce. This is the legacy of the former regime, which was powerful, unlawful and dangerous.
MO1,2 was originally launched without EIA, but when capacity was increased in 2007, there was a non-compliant EIA, to which the Austrian Ministry of the Environment noted many critical issues. At first the SR tried to get away without an EIA, but Austria protested and there was something like a compromise paper with some answers that was used for consultations for the Austrian public.
Austria has clarified that it does not accept the exceptions granted by the Slovak authorities. Austria insisted on an EIA and the implementation of ESPOO, as agreed in the bilateral SR-A document on the implementation of ESPOO. Austria reiterates that the procedure does not correspond to that of a full cross-border EIA procedure, but recognizes that the Slovak side has sought to be very open in its content.
OUTLOOK: In the following it remains to be clarified:
- Is it correct that the Slovak MoE defines the current projects related to MO 1,2 (for which there are presently ongoing decision-making procedures) as mere ‚changes in intended activity‘ compared to the uprate project conducted in the year 2007 (for which a proper EIA has been carried out). Should these current projects not be subject to another EIA process (possibly not an entire EIA process)? It is necessary to look at how the EIA law „Changes …“ defined.
- This requires further technical and legal arguments and information and must reflect the Slovak procedural laws (technical and transparency arguments can be raised only at a time and within a proceeding as allowed by law)
- To what extent have the safety regulations been renewed and taken into account?
General comments:
- Currently valid EIA Act No 24/2006 C.c. has replaced a previous EIA Act No 127/1994 C.c., which was the first EIA legislation in Slovakia. Thus official EIA processes with legal consequences started in Slovakia since 1994.
- Operator of nuclear power plant is obligated to run periodical safety assessment once in ten years.6
- No EIA process for the start of the operation, as the operation started before any EIA legislation in Slovakia came into power.
- EIA 2005: “Increase of efficiency of Blocks V2 NPP Jaslovske Bohunice”: https://www.enviroportal.sk/sk/eia/detail/zvysenie-vykonu-bloku-je-v2-v-jaslovskych-bohuniciach
- EIA 2011-15: Change of operation, proposed by investor (SE a.s.): “Long-term operation NPP V2 (operation of 3rd and 4th unit of nuclear power plant V2, Plant Bohunice), life-time extension for 30 years after the projected lifetime”: https://www.enviroportal.sk/skSK/eia/detail/dlhodoba-prevadzka-je-v2
- EIA process finished upon withdrawal by investor, reasons:
- Reaching the end of projected life-time will not automatically require any of the following proceedings: change, renewal or cancellation of permission to continue nuclear operation
- Law does not require any special permit for the requested change of operation
- Start of operation without proper EIA process, as binding EIA legislation was not yet adopted
- EIA 2007: “Increase of efficiency” is considered to be a “proposed activity” (so the “proposed activity” is not start of operation, but rather this particular a subsequent activity)
- Greenpeace and Global 2000 remember this process to be very formalistic and not according to rules. Global 2000 claims Austrian enviro-ministry stated, that EIA process was not done according to Espoo Convention bi-lateral agreement
- Austrian Ministry of Environment stated: http://www.umweltbundesamt.at/fileadmin/site/umweltthemen/umweltpolitische/ESPOOverfahren/UVP_Mochovce12/Fachstellungnahme_MOCHOVCE_Umschlagfinal.pdf
- EIAs 2018: different proceedings, probably for permits needed to extend lifetime, each requested activity is qualified as “change of proposed activity”. That may be the reason why MoE decided that screening is sufficient and no full EIA process is needed.
- Note that the first of these proceedings is described as “Increase of efficiency” (14.9.2018) and qualified as “change of proposed activity”, whereas the same type of activity (also “Increase of efficiency”) has been qualified as “proposed activity” in 2007 and required full EIA process (not only screening)
- All EIA proceedings here: https://www.enviroportal.sk/sk/eia/detail/zvysenie-vykonu-blokov-je-emo-1-2-v-mochovciach
- Building permit issued in 1986, renewed in 2008 (“decision on change of construction”). New decision was w/out participation, thus a clear violation of law
- EIA 2009-10 (after NGO pressure): Investor calls it “voluntary EIA, because EIA process is not required by the legislation”, page 2: https://www.seas.sk/data/file/87/mo34-eia-zhrnutie07sk.pdf. The whole EIA process was very pro forma, without publishing technical report (which was then the point of the court case)
- 2011 findings of the Aarhus Complience Comittee, in favor of applicant Greenpeace, state that applicable slovak legislation is violating the Aarhus Convention
- 2013 Highest court canceled the building permit. Court ruled in favor of Greenpeace and ordered UJD to renew the permision process. However even w/out a valid permit, construction continued and new permitting process was again very formalistic (e.g. only one small public hearing was held in febriary 2014): https://mylevice.sme.sk/c/6908140/najvyssi-sud-zrusil-povolenie-na-dostavbu-jadrovej-elektrarne-mochovce.html
Report January 2019 (Dana Mareková)
The Slovak nuclear sector is still struggling with its communist heritage. Dangerous nuclear decisions are made behind the closed doors. The nuclear regulator, UJD, has too much power and too little control. It´s decisions are not “double-checked” by a relatively weak (in this area) Ministry of Environment or civil society – as there is no anti-nuclear campaign.
There is however a certain chance to prevent the most dangerous moves by increasing scrutiny. UJD and MoE must feel pressure and there are three kinds of pressure, which seem to be feasible: legal, communication and diplomatic.
- Legal – from well targeted and strategic legal actions.
- Communication – via media.
- And diplomatic – from international community, lead by Austria using UN Conventions.
Slovak nuclear decision-making must not be done behind the closed doors any longer.
Ms Mareková sees a chance to initiate a public-service environmental impact assessment for „old projects“ – including access to information. For both V2 and Mochovce 1-4, certain decisions have been made without a valid EIA and without public participation. Court and Aarhus decisions can be used to challenge this.
Bohunice and Mochovce both have the problem expressed in the ACCC (Aarhus Convention Compliance Committee): The Slovak law does not provide for an adequate (note there was some EIA legislation, but not fully acc to international standards) EIA for buildings that were started before 2006, the date of the adoption of the valid Slovak EIA law. In this respect, some of these old projects did not have a sufficient public participation process , even if it concerns such large projects as Bohunice and Mochovce. This is the legacy of the former regime, which was powerful, unlawful and dangerous.
MO1,2 was originally launched without EIA, but when capacity was increased in 2007, there was a non-compliant EIA, to which the Austrian Ministry of the Environment noted many critical issues. At first the SR tried to get away without an EIA, but Austria protested and there was something like a compromise paper with some answers that was used for consultations for the Austrian public.
Austria has clarified that it does not accept the exceptions granted by the Slovak authorities. Austria insisted on an EIA and the implementation of ESPOO, as agreed in the bilateral SR-A document on the implementation of ESPOO. Austria reiterates that the procedure does not correspond to that of a full cross-border EIA procedure, but recognizes that the Slovak side has sought to be very open in its content.
OUTLOOK: In the following it remains to be clarified:
- Is it correct that the Slovak MoE defines the current projects related to MO 1,2 (for which there are presently ongoing decision-making procedures) as mere ‚changes in intended activity‘ compared to the uprate project conducted in the year 2007 (for which a proper EIA has been carried out). Should these current projects not be subject to another EIA process (possibly not an entire EIA process)? It is necessary to look at how the EIA law „Changes …“ defined.
- This requires further technical and legal arguments and information and must reflect the Slovak procedural laws (technical and transparency arguments can be raised only at a time and within a proceeding as allowed by law)
- To what extent have the safety regulations been renewed and taken into account?
MOCHOVCE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT –
Unit 3 and Unit 4
Presentation at the NEC Conference in Prague on April 5, 2016
The justification for the construction of MO 3+4 echoes the one given for MO 1+2
- The Meciar government had argued the need for the construction of Mochovce unit 1+2 as a replacement for the decommissioned NPP V1 in Jaslovske Bohunice. These reactors have been in service at Mochovce since 1998.
- The Fico government again used the need for replacing NPP V1 in Bohunice as justification for the completion of Mochovce unit 3+4.
History of Mochovce 3+4 1987: construction begins 1992: cessation of building activities followed in 1993 by the commencement of mothballing activities 2008:
- July 15 – ambiguous statement of the European Commission regarding the project to complete NPP Mochovce unit 3+4
- August 14 – decision of the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority to approve the modifications of the restart project. Extension of the building license for Mochovce 3+4 until December 31, 2013 (in 2008 70% of the buildings and 30% of the installations had been completed).
- November 3 – „festive“ inaugural celebrations to mark the completion of Mochovce 3+4
2009:
- Work starts on the further extension of Mochovce NPP 3+4
- February 16 – plans for the environmental impact assessment (EIA) addressing the operation of Mochovce 3+4 are presented to the Slovak Ministry of Environment (Start of the EIA process – objections to the project brought forward by the public).
- June – signing of the contracts with the suppliers of the nuclear installations at the power plant (companies involved: ŠKODA JS, Atomenergostroj, VÚJE, ENSECO, Inžinierske stavby Košice)
2012:
- planned start of operations at MO 3 – currently planned start of operations at MO 3 only by 2017!
2013:
- planned start of operations at MO 4 – currently planned start of operations at MO 4 only by 2018!
Societal problems of the Mochovce 3+4 project
- EIA – process was only initiated after NGOs had exerted pressure for more than a year – lawsuit because of the lacking EIA-procedure.
- Minimal information of the public
- Misleading information to the public: Mochovce 3+4 supposedly equipped with a containment! „The system of containment at Mochovce 3 + 4 is in full compliance and in accordance with requirements put forth by IAEA and WENRA“
- In August 2008 the construction license has been extended (2012, 2013) – while EIA-procedures had not yet been concluded – this happened only by February 2009.
Cost-explosion overruns the project of Mochovce 3+4
- In September 2008 costs amounted to 1,8 bn. €, in 2015 the sum had increased to 4,6 bn. €!
- Insufficient levies for the National Nuclear Fund, scuttling the proposition that the cost of electricity from Mochovce NPP will be low (the levies would have to be at least 3 times higher) – even so, at least 100 €/ Mwh will be required.
- Insufficient liability of the operator of the NPP in the case of nuclear damages
- Mochovce NPP does not solve the problem of dependency concerning the import of fuel raw materials.
Many security problems at Mochovce 3+4
- The projected completion of Mochovce 3+4 NPPs will not be able to offer the level of safety of new reactors. Fundamental design parameters do not allow a complete adaptation to current standards of best practice in technology and science. The possibilities for improvements are limited. It is hard to believe that 40 year old technology can be interpreted as state of the art. No new equipment can change the underlying technology and safety standards inherent in the project.
- The problem of waste disposal concerning spent fuel remains unsolved.
- Lack of a containment
- This project is incapable of withstanding the impact of a big commercial airliner.
- Unproven resilience of the barbotage condenser system at the maximum pressure surge envisaged
- Risk of loss of integrity of the reactor vessel or of the steam generator piping
Problems relating to the operation of Mochovce 3+4 NPP
- Need for major backup capacities – Slovak reactors tend to be off-line for 2-3 months per year (repairs, incidents, refueling)
- Fine-tuning of output is not possible (100% or 0%)
- Efficiency is too low – 30%
- Centralized source of energy – high rate of loss due to grid
- Should a single reactor become unavailable, a substitution for 10% of the electricity demand in the whole country has to be found
- Preponderance of one source of energy – presently more than 54%, the share of nuclear is slated to rise up to 75% after Mochovce has been upgraded = unbalanced system, endangering the energy supply of the country.
Fire protection is focused on the confinement and extinguishing of fires, it is not concerned with the abolition of potential initiating hazards.
- Reactors of the VVER 440/V213 design do not systematically assure separation of cables and wires of redundant system components. It is impossible to retroactively correct the insufficient separation of redundant systems.
Earthquake resilience
- When this VVER 440/V213 unit was originally projected, earthquakes were not being taken into account. Safety mechanisms were supposed to withstand the so-called 10.000 year quake.
- At Paks NPP and Bohunice V2 NPP the subsequent study of earthquake risk led to the conclusion that seismic countermeasure are necessary, as a maximum acceleration of 0.25 g (IAEA 1999) has to be expected.
- Mochovce 1+2 were originally designed to withstand an earthquake of level 4 and a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.06 g. After seismological investigations an earthquake of level 7 and a maximum horizontal acceleration of 0.1 g was assumed as design basis for the project.
- According to SE, AG the seismic upgrade at Mochovce 3+4 has been declared capable of handling up to 0,15 g.
Confinement poses risks VVER 440/V213 containments have limited pressurizing capabilities. The VVER 440/V213 design uses confinement, a system of outer boxes encasing important components in the primary loop. Isolation of radioactive steam, which can be expected to be leaking in the event of a major accident, is not contained by the VVER 440/123 reactor design, it has to be transformed utilizing a peculiar system of condensation. In the course of pressure reduction this confinement could burst, thus releasing radioactive particles into the environment. After the execution of various trials and mechanical enforcement of this barbotage condensation system, functionality of the installations in the case of certain design basis incidents could be established. However, efficacy of the system in the case of major accidents has not been sufficiently demonstrated. Power increase – at Mochovce 1+2 as well as at Mochovce 3+4 power increasing to 107% of the originally envisaged performance is possible. Among other things power upgrades modify the inventory of radioactive particles and thus radiological effects besides enhancing power output. Safety margins decline and aging of components is accelerated. Therefore, the risk of operating sites that have undergone such performance upgrades increases. High burn up rates Increased profitability of the NPP – longer intervals between refueling outages. Requires higher enrichment of the fuel in the assemblies. High burn up (50 MWd/kg) = intensified embrittlement of the fuel rod tubes + enhanced emission of fission products by the fuel pellets (NEA 2002). These changes can negatively effect options available for emergency cooling in the event of an accident involving the highly radioactive primary loop. Reduction of testing and inspection times An increase of the capacity factor by shortening reactor maintenance times translates into increased profits. To accomplish this goal new technologies are put into service. Tests that have traditionally been conducted during maintenance outages are now being executed during operation while the reactor is running at full load. However, tests are most effective when the reactor is shut down. Whenever tests are performed while the reactor is on-line, it must be assured that operating safety margins are not compromised. In particular, the remediation of defects must not be jeopardized. Performing tests while in full power mode enhances operational risk. Current regime: testing of reactor vessels is at present scheduled at 4 year intervals at Mochovce 1+2 and at Bohunice V2. At Mochovce 3+4 an extension of this interval to 8 years is envisaged. License extensions Design lifespan for VVER 440/V213 originally planned – 30 years. Whoever seeks the establishment of extended operating licenses for Mochovce 3+4 NPP to 40 or even 60 years must accept that modified initial requirements for materials used, for the resilience of installations and for documentation standards must be adhered to. Power uprating leads to accelerated aging of the installations. The combination of operating extensions and power uprating may increase the profitability of operating a NPP, but it also tends to reduce safety margins. Components presently stocked at Mochovce 3+4 are in a better condition than the components already installed (AQUILANTI 2007). Aging of Mochovce 3+4 started even before operations commenced. It can be demonstrated that Mochovce 3+4 is riddled by various safety risks inherent in its design. These risks are supposedly eliminated by modernization measures. However, the success of these measures is not assured and an independent review of these issues is not possible, which is highly problematic. Complications in regard to public participation
- August 2013: the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic annulled the ruling of the Slovak nuclear regulatory body that enables the construction of Mochovce 3+4 NPP. The Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic acted unlawfully when it denied NGOs participation in the proceedings.
- Furthermore the Supreme Court ruled that an EIA has to be conducted. The licensing process was to be repeated.
- Construction work at Mochovce NPP was to be halted.
- The Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority initialized a new licensing process, but at the same time issued a ruling on August 21, 2013, overturning the deferral order, thereby enabling the continuation of building activities at Mochovce NPP while the new licensing procedures are conducted.
Obstructing access to information
- The documents released by the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority make it impossible to comment on the safety, quality and conceivable impacts on the environment of the NPP.
- Most important papers have either not been published or they have been partially blackened. This even holds true for information readily available from sources in the public domain.
- The agency also designated information regarding the handling of radioactive waste as secret. Of course the production of radioactive wastes is a direct consequence of operating the site. It is impossible to judge the impacts on the environment without knowledge of this essential factor.
- Current Slovak legislation (Ruling enacted 2010 – nuclear regulation and law governing access to information) enables the Slovak Nuclear Regulatory Authority de facto to declare as secret whatever they wish to hide from the public. This is in disagreement with the Aarhus convention.
The charade around Mochovce is compounding deep concerns about the safety of the NPP, as the official regulatory body blocks the public from gaining access to information on the environmental implications of Mochovce 3+4 in this absurd fashion, thereby preventing citizen stakeholders to participate in the licensing process. Thank you for your attention.
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